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Malaria in the First World War was an unexpected adversary. In 1914, the scientific community had access to new
knowledge on transmission of malaria parasites and their control, but the military were unprepared, and
underestimated the nature, magnitude and dispersion of this enemy. In summarizing available information for allied
and axis military forces, this review contextualizes the challenge posed by malaria, because although data exist across
historical, medical and military documents, descriptions are fragmented, often addressing context specific issues.
Military malaria surveillance statistics have, therefore, been summarized for all theatres of the War, where available.
These indicated that at least 1.5 million solders were infected, with case fatality ranging from 0.2 -5.0%. As more
countries became engaged in the War, the problem grew in size, leading to major epidemics in Macedonia,
Palestine, Mesopotamia and Italy. Trans-continental passages of parasites and human reservoirs of infection created
ideal circumstances for parasite evolution. Details of these epidemics are reviewed, including major epidemics in
England and Italy, which developed following home troop evacuations, and disruption of malaria control activities
in Italy. Elsewhere, in sub-Saharan Africa many casualties resulted from high malaria exposure combined with
minimal control efforts for soldiers considered semi-immune. Prevention activities eventually started but were initially
poorly organized and dependent on local enthusiasm and initiative. Nets had to be designed for field use and were
fundamental for personal protection. Multiple prevention approaches adopted in different settings and their relative
utility are described. Clinical treatment primarily depended on quinine, although efficacy was poor as relapsing
Plasmodium vivax and recrudescent Plasmodium falciparum infections were not distinguished and managed
appropriately. Reasons for this are discussed and the clinical trial data summarized, as are controversies that
arose from attempts at quinine prophylaxis (quininization). In essence, the First World War was a vast experiment in
political, demographic, and medical practice which exposed large gaps in knowledge of tropical medicine and
unfortunately, of malaria. Research efforts eventually commenced late in the War to address important clinical
questions which established a platform for more effective strategies, but in 1918 this relentless foe had outwitted
and weakened both allied and axis powers.
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An unexpected adversary in the First World War was
malaria. It attacked all combatant armies, with adverse
consequences for vast numbers of troops, and devastated
large civilian populations as a result of the environmental,
civil, and demographic effects of troop dispersions and ac-
tivities. The term ‘war malaria’ describes this paradigm [1],
and captures the fact that malaria control in peace-timeCorrespondence: b.j.brabin@liverpool.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.differs from that in war. This difference was exagger-
ated at the beginning of the First World War because
military personnel were unaware that malaria was so
widespread through many parts of Western and Eastern
Europe (Figure 1). Although historians have recognized
that a high proportion of troops died from disease ra-
ther than combat [2], malaria has received little em-
phasis, such that the subject is frequently not indexed
in historical books or referenced in First World War
manuscripts.
By 1914, parts of Europe had made considerable pro-
gress in malaria control, particularly in Italy and Greeces an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Figure 1 Geographic distribution of malaria transmission in theatres of the First World War. Source: references [3] and [4], modified to
illustrate non-malarial areas. Epidemic areas are schematically drawn and indicative of regions affected.
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around 1900, the anopheline mosquito cycle was only
just becoming accepted, and the important vectors, as
well as the developmental cycle in the red cell, were only
recently recognized. The damage the War inflicted on
the political, social, and economic progress achieved in
malaria control lasted until well into the twentieth cen-
tury. There are questions as to why the First World War
was so conducive to an explosion of malaria, leading to
epidemics, conflicts on solutions, and clinical controver-
sies on how to manage the basic disease in individual
troops in different malaria endemic settings. These is-
sues affected all armies as the malaria parasite had no
alignment and could be transmitted unseen across the-
atres of war. The activities of soldiers aided its progress
by increasing mosquito numbers through operational ac-
tivities favouring transmission, especially as soldiers
tended to burrow underground which is conducive to
water – logging and favourable to mosquito breeding. By
1916, as more countries became involved, these effects
multiplied creating ideal war conditions for the outbreak
of several European malaria epidemics. The conse-
quences compromised military planning, logistics, and
the battle prospects of combatants, who became increas-
ingly ineffective, as well as affecting huge swathes of ci-
vilian populations [6]. Re-deployment of non-immunetroops to replace sick troops in malaria-affected war
zones enhanced the problem, as did the inability to ef-
fectively treat soldiers suffering from malaria. Deploy-
ment of large numbers of troops from tropical Africa
and India introduced into the European theatre a large
human reservoir of infections with new parasite strains
carried by semi-immune soldiers. The lack of knowledge
of the hepatic stage of development of the P. vivax malaria
parasite, which was only described in 1948 [7], com-
pounded the situation and was instrumental in recurrently
ineffective treatments being prescribed, and evacuations
of vast numbers of sick troops from combat zones.
Only late in the war was it appreciated that preventive
measures were possible. In the interim medical doctors
struggled against this clinical adversary. The war docu-
mentation on the topic is diverse and has not previously
been assimilated. Much reporting on the size of the
problem has been anecdotal, due to limitations in sur-
veillance statistics. This review aims to summarize avail-
able information and contextualize the main aspects in
order to establish the nature of this formidable adversary
in times of war.
Search strategy
Physical searches for historical information used library
resources at the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine,
Brabin Malaria Journal 2014, 13:497 Page 3 of 22
http://www.malariajournal.com/content/13/1/497and the inter-library loan facilities of the University of
Liverpool. Journal references in English, French, German
and Italian were searched for the years 1914–1925. The
Historical Library Collection of Tropical Medicine at the
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and the Ronald
Ross Archive at the Sydney Jones Library, University of
Liverpool, were searched. For recent publications elec-
tronic databases were examined for historical context
and scientific content. These included PubMed, Scopus,
ISI Web of knowledge, the UK Parliamentary Records Re-
source, The Guardian newspaper and The Times news-
paper Histories of the War. Reference lists from both
general medical and historical journals were searched. Lack
of appropriate indexing terms in early publications re-
stricted the search for articles written before availability of
electronic databases. The Official UK volumes published
by His Majesty’s Stationary Office on Medical Services, Hy-
giene, Pathology, Casualties and Medical Statistics of the
War were an important resource and are page referenced,
as information on malaria was widely indexed across all
volumes [2,8-14] (Figure 2).
Military malaria surveillance statistics 1914–1918
Initially it is necessary to estimate the military popula-
tions at risk, and associated malaria related mortality.
Central to estimates of malaria exposure risk is infor-
mation on troop numbers in the exposed military pop-
ulations, which is data largely available in historical
references and archives. Officially reported annual
strengths of the British Expeditionary Forces in all theatres
of the War were published in 1931 [2]. Figures are also
available from historical sources that take account of troop
movements and re-deployments. Few statistics are avail-
able for ‘followers’, or attached military personnel, who
were not fighting troops. Table 1 provides information ofFigure 2 Official UK Government War Volumes on Medical Services, H
Volumes on Surgery of the War also published [15].military populations exposed for both the allied and axis
powers. This includes regional areas of troop locations.
Also provided are malaria surveillance case numbers, and
malaria incidence estimates per 1,000 troops for the pe-
riods specified in the table. When publications included
numbers of deaths related to malaria, this information
was used to estimate case fatality, which is as a range
when sources giving variable mortality estimates were
available. Estimates of the approximate military popula-
tions exposed are provided taking account of their variable
composition. Troop numbers are often provided on an an-
nual basis, which would include many of the same troops
tallied annually in sequential years. In terms of malaria
risk per annum these numbers should be interpreted addi-
tively, ie 100,000 men present over four years in a military
zone equate to a total of 400,000 persons years malaria
risk for the time period of the war. Another problem is
that, although reference sources are listed in the table,
there are differences in published troop numbers between
sources. For this reason ranges of troop numbers are pro-
vided. This table is the first compilation of global malaria
troop statistics for the First World War. It is divided ac-
cording to the regional locations of troops of both allied
and axis powers located in Europe and the Middle East, or
outside this area in sub-Saharan Africa. In the European
theatre there is the Western front in France and Belgium
bordering with Germany; the large Eastern Front which
stretched across the Austro-Hungarian border with Russia
and Romania; a more Southerly front in the Balkan region
of Macedonia including borders with Greece, Bulgaria,
Albania and Turkey; an Eastern Front of the Ottoman
Empire borders in the Middle East including Syria,
Palestine, as well as Egypt, and Mesopotamia (modern
Iraq). In sub-Saharan Africa locations are listed in East,
West and South-West Africa. Allied armies were: Greatygiene, Pathology, and Medical Statistics. References: [2,8-14].
Table 1 Military malaria surveillance statistics 1914 – 1918
Military forces Location Years Military case (n) and
incidence estimates
Military
deaths (n)
Case
fatality, %
Military population
exposed (n)
Malaria
speciesa
References
Europe and Middle
East
British Macedonia and
Salonika plain
1916 (Oct)
-1918
162,517, 369
per 1000c
787 0.2-0.48 404,207b – 549,111 Mostly Pv [16], ([2] p2, p80),
British, French
150,000,
Serbs 200,000
[1,17]
French Macedonia 1916–1917 66,271 667 2.10d [18-21]
British North Russia 1918–1919 35, 8.7 per 1000,
32,688
? 22,258 Pv, Pf ([2] p2,p80)
German, Bulgarian Balkans 1915–1918 113 per 1000 – 380,000 - 462,000 Pv [22,23]
Macedonia 1916-1917 21,672 ? 0.92 – Mostly Pv Pf,
Pm Pv, Pf
[19,22]
British, French Italy 1917-1918 7373 (40% relapses) ? – 145,764 - 210,943 Pv, Pf ([2] p2,p80),
Italian 1915-1918 Many thousands ? 0.03-1.3 [6,12]
Australian Desert
Mounted Corps
Palestine 1918 (May-Dec) Of 19,652 illnesses,
6,347 slide positive
40,000 Mostly Pf [24]
Palestine 1918 (Sept-Oct) 1940 98 5.05e [24]
British & Dominion Egypt and
Palestine
1914–1918 40,144 854 f 2.13 1,192,511 Pv, Pf ([2] p80), [24]
British Palestine 1918 (Apr-Sept) 7,270 70,000 [25]
Turkish Ottoman
territory
1914-1918 412,000 - 461,799 20,000 -23,351 4.8 350,000 Pv, Pf [26,27]
German Ottoman
territory
1915-July 1918 4,763, 308 per 1000 ? – 5540 [22], ([28] p231)
German Dardanelles Apr 1915-Jan 1916 200 per 1000g ? – 1000 ([28] p231), [29]
Mixed allied force Mesopotamia 1914-1918 59,323 284 h 0.76 889,702 – 969,388 Mostly Pv ([2] p2 p80)
Kuwait,
Nasiriya
1915–1917 1,365, main admission ? – 468,987 - 489,000 [10]
Dardanelles Apr 1915-Jan 1916 1,473 5 0.34 [1], ([2] p80)
Western Front:
Allied & United
States
North-East
France
and Belgium
1914-1918 9,022, outbreaks of <20 14 0.16 5,399,563 - 6,843,563 Mostly Pv ([30] p75,p115),
([2] p80), [31],
([32] p439-441)
Western Front:
German
1914-1918 11,222, <1 per 1000 ? – 5,200,000 Pv, Pf [22], ([32]
p439), [33]
Eastern Front Allied:
Russian, Romanian
Russia, Romania,
Armenia, Georgia.
Anatolia, Albania
1915-1916 Albanian armies
suffered severely
from malaria
? – 525,000 i Pv, Pf, Pm ([30], p153),
[21,34,35]
Brabin
M
alaria
Journal2014,13:497
Page
4
of
22
http://w
w
w
.m
alariajournal.com
/content/13/1/497
Table 1 Military malaria surveillance statistics 1914 – 1918 (Continued)
Eastern Front Axis:
German
Galicia and Anatolia 1914–1918 29,952 ? ? k 228,000 – 750,000j [22,28] p137, [35]
5.1 per 1000
Turkish,
Austro-Hungarian
Yugoslavia 1917-1918 128 per 1000 ? – 270,000 – 1,045,050 ([30] p47), ([36]
p399)
Evacuations to
England from
Europe and Africa
UK 1917-1918 34,000, 500 local cases
in Southern England
323 0.95 ≥34,000 Pv, Pf ([17] p140), [37]
Outside Europe and
Middle East
British expeditionary East Africa,
Kenya,
Tanganyika
1915-1918 145,850 troops and
68,914 indigenous,
51.000 hospitalized,
126 per 1000(troops),
20 per 1000 (others)
831 troops with
2839 indigenous
0.57 250,000 British
(75,366) and
indigenous with
150,000 Indian
Mostly Pf [2] p2, p80,
[39]
4.12
South-West
Africa
1914–1915 518 2 0.39 33,000 Mostly Pf ([2] p2, p80)
Cameroon 1915–1916 2410 5 0.21 3000 Pf [14,40]
Sierra Leone 1914 401, 1839 per 1000 ? 0 ? 0.00 218 Pf [41]
German expeditionary Togo, East and
South-West
Africa
1914-1918 Lower incidence as
mostly indigenous
forces used
? – 18,000 l, 3000
German troops,
remainder
indigenous
Mostly Pf [35,42]
USA naval Americas, Caribbean 1917-1918 4,746 hospital cases,
68,373 man-sick days
7 0.15 – Mixed [43]
Dashed indicate information not identified, and question mark unknown mortality case numbers.
aPv: Plasmodium vivax; Pf: Plasmodium falciparum; Pm: Plasmodium malariae.
bEstimate includes British, French, Serbian, and Russian troops.
c13.7% in British troops; 27.4% in Indian troops.
dOf 100 autopsies of influenza pneumonia, 83 showed definite evidence of previous malaria [19].
eEstimated from graphic data from all cases in Sept-Oct and deaths reported in October [24].
fDeaths due to P.falciparum infections. Confirmed diagnoses in 32 of 67 autopsies; many complicated by dual infection with influenza bronchopneumonia [44].
gEstimate for German troops only.
hDeaths for years 1917–1918 only.
iBrusilov offensive 1915–1916.
jRusso-Turkish offensive winter 1915 – 1916.
kOf 2,873,000 men mobilized on the Turkish side in Ottoman territory, approximately 466,759 died of disease [28].
lEstimate for East African German forces.
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Central axis armies were: Germany, Austro-Hungary, the
Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria.
War-time statistics may be underestimated by health
officials as some armies did not keep adequate records,
and for several locations there is missing data, especially
for mortality, and for civilians who were exposed to
many of the same adverse conditions. One previous ap-
proximation of the number of allied troops with malaria
was 500,000, although the basis for the calculation was
unclear [30,37]. Incidence estimates per 1,000 men were
available for some, but not all, locations. The sum total
of case numbers for the War for the allied troops is
617,150 with 3,865 malaria deaths, which gives a case fa-
tality estimate of 0.63%, or slightly more than one in
every 200 infected soldiers dying from malaria. For the
axis powers these estimates are 562,096, with 23,351
deaths, which gives a much higher malaria case fatality
estimate of 4.15%, or more than four deaths for every
hundred soldiers with malaria. This difference could re-
flect better management practices, and quinine regimens
used by the allied forces in cases of severe malaria, or
the influence of pre-War prevention measures developed
by Ross on malaria control during the War. The table
also lists the reported malaria case fatality estimates spe-
cific to different campaign areas. These vary between
0.15% - 5.05%. This variation partly arises due to troop
composition, as regiments with larger contingents of
tropical indigenous troops would be expected to have
lower mortality risk due to their acquired immunity. An-
other factor is the proportional exposure risk in different
areas for P. falciparum malaria compared to P. vivax.
This data refers to the direct impact of malaria, but does
not account for indirect effects on morbidity and mor-
tality. For example soldiers anaemic with chronic mal-
aria would succumb more readily following battle
injuries or major surgery.
Table 1 indicates evidence for the intensity of malaria in
several locations, particularly in Macedonia (present day
Greece and environs), The Ottoman Empire (present day
Turkey and environs), Mesopotamia (present day Iraq and
Iran), Palestine, and East Africa. Malaria was a smaller
problem on the Western Front, although the destruction
of dykes in Flanders, causing local flooding, led to indigen-
ous P. vivax cases. Prisoners of war returning to Flanders,
who were infected in German concentration camps, is
also reported [31]. In trenches where both European
and African troops were present a small number of P.
falciparum cases were reported amongst German troops
[33]. In Gallipoli, malaria was never reported as a prom-
inent cause of inefficiency, although the coastal area of
the peninsula was considered highly malarious.
Malaria had a much greater impact on the Eastern
Front involving the Russian, Romanian, and AlbanianTroops, although quantitative information on malaria is
not adequately defined for these countries. These armies
were probably severely affected, with substantial mal-
aria–related mortality [34]. Statistics shown in Table 1
for the German armies were reported by Zieman [22],
although these did not provide mortality data, and he in-
dicated they were underestimates. The accuracy of esti-
mates of troop numbers resident in the Ottoman Front
have been questioned [36], and Erickson considered that
earlier estimates vastly underestimated the true number
of Ottoman casualties from disease as well as combat
[28]. By the end of the Brusilov offensive in late summer
1916, the Hapsburg army had officially lost 464,382 men
and 10,756 officers, with 350,000 prisoners of war - a
loss from which they never recovered. High malaria
mortality estimates (23,000 approximately) have been re-
ported for Turkish troops [26], but the number of cases
and deaths for the army as a whole is difficult to quan-
tify with no statistics for prisoners of war who would be
likely to receive little in the way of protection from
infection.
Underestimation in surveillance statistics is difficult to
quantify due to failure to identify low grade or asymp-
tomatic infections, which can cause debilitating chronic
anaemia without occurrence of febrile episodes. The sta-
tistics also do not reflect the occurrence of relapsing
vivax infections in soldiers taking low doses of prophy-
lactic quinine, or falciparum infections in soldiers from
the tropics with partial malaria immunity. Diagnostic
misclassification would be expected unless a blood slide
was taken, as clinical features of acute malaria have a
broad differential diagnosis that includes diarrhoea and
pneumonia. Febrile soldiers may also have suffered mixed
malarial infections [45]. Autopsies conducted in Palestine
by Manson-Bahr confirmed mixed infections with
bronchopneumonia and malignant tertian malaria (P.
falciparum), with influenza as dual infection. He con-
sidered that the mechanisms of early diagnosis and
treatment broke down in rapidly advancing troops in
malarious areas [44].
Use of regional malaria incidence data from Table 1
and the corresponding military population estimates al-
lows the expected number of malaria cases in the mili-
tary to be calculated for a given region (Table 2).
Comparison of the expected and observed estimates
shows some agreement except for the Ottoman territory
and East Africa, where incidences are almost certainly
underestimated, and do not take sufficient account of re-
crudescent or relapsing infections, which would greatly
increase expectant numbers. This suggests that at least
for these areas incidence rates underestimate the true
rates. Malarial mortality due to Blackwater Fever was re-
ported amongst expeditionary forces in East Africa [12],
although there was no record of this occurring amongst
Table 2 Estimated malaria cases based on size of military forces
Location Perioda (years) Malaria incidence
(per 1000 troops)
Estimated military
population
Expected number
of malaria casesb
Observed number of
malaria surveillance cases
British and Dominion forces
Macedonia 3 369 404,207 149,076 162,517
Western Front 4 <1 5,399,563 <5,400 9,022
6,843,563c <6843
East Africa 3 126 250,000 31,500 145,850
North Russia 2 8.7 22,258 194 35
German and Central Powers forces
Balkans 4 113 380,000 42,940 32,688
462,000 55,206 –
Ottoman territory:
- Turkish troops 4 308 350,000 107,800 412,000 –461,799
- German troops 2 308 5540 1689 4,763
Dardanelles – German troops 1 200 1000 200 –
Galicia and Anatolia Eastern Front 2 5.1 228,000d 1,163 29,952
750,000e 3,825 –
1,045,050 5,330 –
Yugoslavia 2 128 270,000 34,560 –
Western Front 4 <1 5,200,000 <5,200 11,222
Dashes: information not identified.
aApproximate duration of exposure.
bEstimate based on single incident case per soldier, and does not include recurrent episodes or relapses for the same individuals.
cExpected malaria cases based on two estimates for Western Front troop sizes.
dMilitary numbers only for Russo-Turkish offensive winter 1915–1916 [35].
eExpected malaria cases using estimates for Hapsburg army size of 750,000[46] or 1,045,000 [32].
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who died other than from wounds, 64.2% died from
Blackwater Fever between 1914 and 1917. In Macedonia,
of 136 cases of Blackwater fever, 36 died (26.5%), and
amongst the French, mortality was 30% [12]. It was re-
ported less frequently in Togoland and Mesopotamia. In
Macedonia, Wenyon considered that hardships, expos-
ure and unpreparedness under war conditions explained
the high case fatality from malaria in 1916 (1.01%), and
that the lower mortality in 1917 and 1918 (0.37% and
0.31% respectively) would have been still further reduced
if ordinary peace-time precautions had been available
[19]. High mortality was due to life under war-time condi-
tions and not any particular feature of the parasite, al-
though it followed closely the incidence rate of falciparum
malaria. Overall British mortality from malaria in
Macedonia was 0.7 per 1,000 troops, while for the French,
for the same period (January-June 1918), mortality was
ten times higher (6.4%) [19].
Malaria epidemics during the war
A number of basic conditions cause epidemics [47],
sometimes separately, or together as in the First World
War. These occurred in the regions of Macedonia,Palestine and Egypt, and in Western Europe following
the return of troops to England, Italy and elsewhere. An
increase in vectorial capacity due to high production of
vector anopheline mosquitos was probably critical. This
could have resulted from more breeding places (or de-
terioration in larval control), prolonged mosquito sur-
vival, or increased man-vector contact. In desert fringe
regions rainfall and malaria transmission are often con-
nected. The El Nino Southern Climatic Oscillations
(ENSO) for the years of 1914–1915 and 1918–1919 may
have produced favourable climatic conditions for epi-
demic transmission as the impact of ENSO in malaria
epidemic prediction is well-established [38]. The ENSO
for 1918–1919 was one of the strongest in the twentieth
century [48]. The movement of infected persons, as
troops migrated from India and sub-Saharan Africa,
combined with the immigration of non-immune European
soldiers further created ideal conditions for the explosive
epidemics which occurred.
The Macedonian epidemic
This event was one of the greatest medical surprises of
the war with more than a quarter of the half a million al-
lied troops immobilized with sickness and equivalent
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Amongst British troops, peak prevalence patterns were
observed seasonally from July to November in 1916 and
1917, and with double peaks between May and November
in 1918 (Figure 3). Relapsing vivax cases infected in the
previous year may have contributed to the early peak
prevalence in 1918, and falciparum malaria may have
induced some vivax relapses in the late second peak in
1918 [49]. The species pattern observed amongst FrenchFigure 3 Epidemic pattern of malaria in allied forces in
Macedonia 1916–1919. Source: references [10,11]. Horizontal axis
in months.troops in 1916 showed peak vivax prevalence preceding
peak falciparum prevalence by three months (Figure 4)
[20]. This was similar to the species pattern seen in British
troops in Palestine and Egypt in 1918 [49]. No deaths
were reported between January and March 1916, and
epidemic peaks in mortality followed corresponding
peak prevalence patterns (Figure 3), with mortality peaks
in 1916 corresponding to the monthly peak prevalence
periods of vivax and falciparum malaria. Mean malaria
mortality remained below 2%, with peak mortality of
5.1% in September 1917.
The malaria epidemic in Greece resulted in ten allied
casualties for every one inflicted by the axis powers [35].
There was no escape from the mosquito under the en-
demic conditions in which these armies fought. The sur-
prise of the high mortality and the magnitude of the
immobilized forces induced Generals to respond to the
malaria crisis, which required a greater expenditure on
labour to clear mosquito breeding sites. This effort was
insufficient as it was not known that mosquitoes could
spread beyond about 500 metres from their breeding
sites. The main vectors were Anopheles maculipennis
and Anopheles superpictus, and the sporozoite rate var-
ied between 0.5% and 5.5% [19,50]. The British, French
and German armies were virtually immobilized for three
years, with a French General telegramming that his army
was in hospital with malaria [16,18]. This caused French
military authorities to think seriously about the crisis,
hugely improved efforts at quinine prophylaxis of troops
[18], and rapid evacuation of infected troops. As a result
they experienced less malaria than the British. The
British introduced the Y management scheme of quinine
treatment (15 gr/day x 14 days, then 60 gr/wk x 6 days
in optional divided doses; every soldier to keep 60 gr for
self-treatment if relapses), which included removal of
heavily infected individuals, with 25,000 men evacuated
in 1917 [19]. Other measures included every known
method of combating the disease including swamp and
stream clearance (Figure 5), oiling, treatment of breedingFigure 4 Parasite species differentiation in French troops in
Macedonia. Source: reference [20]. Horizontal axis in months.
Figure 5 Draining the marshes to prevent malaria on the Eastern Front. Source: reference [52], published under the Open Government
Licence, v 2.0.
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quinine prophylaxis. Despite these efforts, it is doubtful
whether any appreciable reduction in infectious episodes
occurred [19]. Most of these measures were introduced
effectively too late in the campaign, partly due to con-
flicting opinions on prioritization, but also delays in
obtaining netting and sufficient quantities of quinine
[10]. Quinine prophylaxis had been recommended by
Ronald Ross, consultant Physician to the Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force, but was not favourably reported on
by medical officers. Ross visited the area between 26th
November 1917 and 18th January 1918, yet surprisingly
makes no mention of the epidemic in his memoirs [51].
The area became a large military hospital and the spec-
tacular image of a well-equipped army paralysed by mal-
aria is a sober reminder of its potential severity.
The Palestine and Mesopotamia epidemic
The epidemic amongst British troops commenced im-
mediately after they moved into this malaria endemic
area in early 1916, and after the incubation period had
passed (Figure 6). Malaria was also introduced into the
Sinai region by troops from India, who eventually com-
prised about three quarters of troop numbers. It was
difficult to locate camps away from highly endemic
areas in southern Mesopotamia (modern Iraq.) Cases of
marine malaria were reported with higher incidence in
ships anchored closer to the shore [53]. Initially cases
were mostly caused by P. vivax infection. Malaria be-
came more widespread during the campaign with the
largest epidemic occurring in 1918, with proportionally
more P. falciparum infections. The operations of Indian
and British forces in 1918 involved campaigns in some
of the most malarious areas. Successive advancingfronts across the whole region continuously placed troops
in new transmission areas (Figure 7). The British military
failure at the siege of Kut in 1916 (Figure 7), and the over-
all military failure of the Turkish army was related to sol-
diers being overwhelmed by malaria, although the
disabling of soldiers by the disease was not to the same ex-
tent as in Macedonia. Accurate returns on malaria were
mainly available to the end of September 1918, and the
main British military attack then occurred on September
19th [25]. The 1918 epidemic did not commence until
temperature averages had risen above 15.5°C in early
June, which were climatic conditions favouring mosquito
breeding. If the British advance in mid-September had
been delayed the successful outcome might have been dif-
ferent. Incidence was falling by November, which was con-
sidered due to the extent of the anti-malarial measures
undertaken earlier in the year [25]. In addition to British
and Indian troops, Australian mounted forces also experi-
enced epidemic malaria with a high case fatality of 5%,
which related to dual infections with P. falciparum mal-
aria and influenza (Figure 8) [24]. Australian statistics on
their cavalry advance showed that the sick outnumbered
the battle wounded by 37:1 [49].
A small number of malaria diagnostic stations providing
malaria microscopy were established in April 1918, by
British and Australian commands, and with specially
trained medical officers and orderlies [9]. Rapid diagnosis
may have reduced case fatality and helped to check the
epidemic in Palestine. Over 111,000 blood smears were
examined by the Australian New Zealand Army Corps la-
boratory, and of 40,000 slides examined by British diag-
nostic stations 28.9% were positive [49,55]. A number of
other measures were introduced and by 1918 the extent of
anopheline breeding meant there was no time to be lost.
Figure 6 Epidemic pattern of malaria in allied forces in
Palestine 1917 – 1918. Source: references [10,11,54]. Horizontal axis
in months.
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with £10,000 for drainage clearance alone [9]. Deep shell
holes rapidly fill with water, and British clearance work
was hampered by Turkish shelling of working parties.
Some tributary origins were within Turkish lines and the
British felt that the Turks failed to appreciate that the de-
struction of mosquito breeding places by the allies would
also be beneficial to their own army as mosquitoes tra-
versed front lines [25]. As a consequence, malaria amongst
allied troops increased in frequency with further advancesinto Turkish positions (Figure 7). The micro-epidemiology
of malaria in this varied terrain was challenging, and
the operations were difficult and costly to sustain. The
full effects of these anti-malarial measures are difficult
to assess, and they were introduced late in the cam-
paign. The drafting of replacement troops to Palestine
from Macedonia introduced an additional human reser-
voir for mosquito infection, which reduced benefits
achieved from the evacuation of infected troops.
The epidemics in England and Italy
In England between 1900 and 1914 only two cases of
malaria had been observed in soldiers who had never
been out of the country [56,57]. Following 1914, cases
gradually increased reaching epidemic proportions in
1918 (Figure 9). In 1917, Ross had concluded that true
indigenous malaria foci had never disappeared from the
island of Sheppey on the north Kent coast, where
healthy carriers of P. vivax were identified [58]. The
Ministry of Health did not station soldiers returning
from malarious regions in parts of Kent or Sussex be-
cause of concerns about local transmission. The First
World War brought the problem of malaria back to
England, leading to the last epidemic of malaria in the
country and substantially increased local transmission
(Figure 9). The problem arose from troops returning from
Egypt, Turkey, Macedonia, Italy, West and East Africa.
Table 3 shows malaria statistics on reinforcements to the
British expeditionary Force arriving in France from
Macedonia and Palestine in June 1918 and illustrates the
magnitude of the problem [59]. These soldiers brought
back infections of P. vivax and P. falciparum malaria to
areas which had been free of disease for many years, and
many had to be evacuated from France to England for
treatment. Soldiers returning from a wide diaspora were
admitted with malaria to the London Hospital during
1918 and 1919 (Table 4). Before the end of the war, 34,000
military cases returned to five camps set up in England for
their treatment, and 500 locally transmitted infections
were identified [60]. In 1919, the Ministry of Health made
malaria notification compulsory [30] in order to identify
infection foci.
In a military camp on the Isle of Sheppey soldiers in
training who had never left England contracted malaria,
and in one regiment 30 cases occurred. These were lo-
cally contracted as An. maculipennis mosquitoes could
be found without difficulty in occupied huts [60]. In the
ports of Liverpool, London and Bristol, during 1917,
more than 500 cases of malignant tertian malaria were
introduced mostly from West Africa. The newly com-
pleted building of the Liverpool School of Tropical
Medicine was nominated for use for hospital treatment
of infected soldiers and undertook clinical trials of quin-
ine treatment [62,63]. The main source of infection for
Figure 7 Dynamics of troop movements in the Middle East, 1914–1918. Source: adapted from reference [32].
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cases, which occurred after 1916, was relapsing vivax
malaria among returned soldiers [64,65]. Prompt identifi-
cation of infection foci, and quarantining infected soldiers
and sailors in a small number of dedicated hospitals, en-
abled effective epidemic control and limitation of indigen-
ous transmission [65].
There was a rise in reported cases in several other
European countries due to malaria introduced by return-
ing troops [30]. In Vienna, 3717 cases were reported in
1919, and epidemics occurred in Albania and Corsica,
although in Germany it was not as serious a problem
after the War. There were post-war epidemics in
Ukraine and Russia, and an outbreak occurred as far
North as Arkhangelsk (‘Archangel’) in the arctic [2,30].
In Russia 360,670 cases were reported in 1919, rising to5,865,828 annual cases in 1924, when incidence reached
446 per 10,000 population with at least 600,000 case fa-
talities [30]. In Italy, there was a ferocious epidemic,
which devastated the nation in 1917–1918, in which tens
of thousands of civilians and soldiers perished (Figure 9)
[6]. The Italian Front was as violent as the Western
Front, and Snowden reports that the horrors of battle
were so great that some soldiers purposefully avoided
taking quinine in order to become malaria-infected and
be evacuated – a response described as ‘malaria defeat-
ism’ [6]. The large number of evacuated troops and pris-
oners of war, collapse of the pre-war Italian malaria
campaign, requisitioning of Italian hospitals by Austrian
forces, shortages of quinine, and war-time disruption left
the Italian population at high risk of malaria infection.
In 1917–1918, the epidemic was at its peak and lead to
Figure 8 Malaria epidemic ANZAC Mounted Division,
Sept – Oct 1918. Source: reference [24]. Case numbers
estimated from graphical data.
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twentieth century [6]. Almost 50,000 soldiers were repa-
triated from highly endemic areas and created an epi-
demic route through to Southern Italy, which
experienced an excess of falciparum infections compared
to Northern provinces.
Malaria in sub-Saharan Africa
African expeditionary forces were at high risk for P. fal-
ciparum infection. British and German armies were con-
stituted with a majority of indigenous or Indian troops
who should have been less susceptible due to their ac-
quired immunity [2]. Table 1 gives estimates of the pro-
portions of these contingents, and shows that in East
Africa, whilst malaria incidence was lower in indigenous
and Indian troops, their total malaria mortality was
higher as they were a much larger fighting force. Imper-
ial troops and supporting bearers serving in East Africa
had a death rate that exceeded any other theatre of war
[66], and measured up to those in the great European
bloodbaths [67]. The medical provisions for the African
and Indian troops were poor, and they were exempted
from the general order for quinine prophylaxis. The
Germans, who were a relatively small force, had a higher
ratio of porters to soldiers (7:1) than the allies (4:1), and
also high standards of disease prevention. They never-
theless reported some deaths from Blackwater Fever
from staff receiving one grain quinine daily as self-
treatment [68]. Ocean Road Hospital in Dar es Salaam
was requisitioned from the Germans by the British at
the outbreak of the War and was used for treating
British soldiers. Although some attempts at malaria con-
trol were introduced in 1914, including sanitary inspec-
tions and importation of anti-larval fish [40], General
Smuts, who commanded the British forces, may havebeen negligent with regard to malaria control offering
too little, too late [66,69]. The numerous preventive
approaches so carefully developed in Macedonia and
Salonika were not attempted, as most reliance was
placed on quinine prophylaxis. Quinine supplied to the
Army and Navy was below indicated strength due to
war profiteering, whereas specimens captured from the
Germans (and of German manufacture) produced quin-
ine toxicity or cinchonism with much smaller doses. In
July 1918, a small outbreak in marines visiting East
Africa was attributed to sub-standard prophylaxis due to
this problem [70]. Germany subsequently used the re-
search station at Amani in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) to
produce its own quinine supply. Sub-standard quinine
was an important reason for the resurgence of malaria in
other regions during and after the War [5,71].
In Cameroon and Sierra Leone in West Africa, smaller
numbers troops were deployed compared to East Africa,
and few military deaths from malaria were reported
[40,41,72]. Malaria incidence was high, despite troops
using mosquito nets and quinine prophylaxis, and many
troops had repeated admissions with marked anaemia
and debility [41]. Expert microscopy and treatment was
available. Amongst reinforcements arriving from India
to Muscat, on the southern Arabian coast opposite East
Africa, 25% had splenomegaly [73]. The extent of infec-
tion in these soldiers was not appreciated and many
returned to India on account of fever after residence for
only a short period in battle zones.
The Pacific region
In Pacific malaria endemic regions, the New Zealanders
took German Samoa in August 1914, and the Australians
German New Guinea in September [32]. The Japanese oc-
cupied the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas islands the
following month. Fighting in these regions, which possibly
had the highest malaria vectorial capacity of any war zone,
would have resulted in serious malaria-related illness, as
their malaria control strategies were similar, or less devel-
oped to those used elsewhere. It was known that anophe-
lene mosquitoes carried malaria but the identity of the
local vectors had not been established [74].
Malaria control approaches
The greatest experience of preventive measures was de-
rived from activities in Macedonia, and these were ap-
plicable to all theatres of the War and could be classified
as: drug prophylaxis and treatment, mosquito deterrents,
personal protection, or mosquito destruction [11]. New
approaches were developed during the War which ad-
vanced practical and operational strategies. These are
summarized and compared with pre-1914 approaches in
Table 5. The lack of pre-war scientific evidence on all of
these control strategies was a major restriction. There
Figure 9 Malaria patterns following troop evacuations in England and Wales 1917 – 1918, and Italy 1914–1918. Source: references [6]
and [60].
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aria, as well as controversy in Germany before the War
between Erhlich and Bordet on the nature of the immune
response to infections [75]. During the War, operational
evaluations of some prevention measures were developed,
and the most feasible was testing quinine treatment and
prophylaxis, as it was more readily controlled, follow-up
was realistic, and outcome determinants were easily mea-
sured. In view of the extent of the variety of these war-
time trials, data on quininization is covered in a separ-
ate section. Personal prophylaxis with quinine was cha-
otic with weak understanding of medicines in
management, problems in drug delivery due to night
operations, enemy bombs and attacks, and servicemen
may also have hidden the drug to exchange for ciga-
rettes [76]. The British questioned the use of quinine
for prevention and placed more emphasis on prevent-
ing contact with mosquitoes. A survey of 129 officers
on the utility of quinine by the War Office reportedonly four felt it was of definite value, ten of some value,
and the remainder of no value [11].
Personal anti-mosquito ointments were messy and
head nets and gloves were very restrictive especially in
active combat (Figure 10). It was actually as important
to protect infected men from uninfected mosquitoes as
it was the reverse. Environmentally, the need for fre-
quent spraying of pyrethrum for mosquito control de-
terred its use by German forces although the British
army used it occasionally (Lefroy’s fluid) in the First
World War [30]. In many areas, the very high density of
mosquitoes made it impossible to control the vector. Ex-
tensive drainage was impossible in mountain terrain, or
when campaigns were highly mobile. Identification of vec-
tors gave a sounder basis for control and studies were
undertaken on entomological parameters [50]. Notions of
integrated control and the mapping of community reser-
voirs of infection were emerging and were completed in
response to the epidemic in England [60], but remained
Table 3 Malaria statistics on reinforcements to British expeditionary Force arriving in France in June 1918 [59]
Regimenta % infected with malaria Casesb (n) Daily sick parade malaria statistics
5th Connaught Rangers 80 82 If regiment ordered to service in forward
area at least 50% unable to comply
5th Royal Irish 75 80 30/650 parasite positivec
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers 100 (last 2 years) 175 25% parasite positive
13th Black Watch Scottish 80 573 30/day reported sick with malaria
14th Kings Liverpool 75 146 60-70/day with malaria
5th Inniskillin Fusiliers 75 175 600/824 have had malaria; 30% parasite positive
1st Kings own Yorkshire Light Infantry 70 42 Only 30% of regiment never had malaria
13th Manchester 80 52 Average 4/day relapsing
9th Gloucester 80 – 60-70/day with relapsing malaria
2nd Royal Munster 80 80 Men with acute malaria may not report sick
6th Inniskillin Fusiliers 75 21 110 hospitalized since June 1918
6th Leinster 75 87 480 with malaria since June 1st 1918
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers 75 58 27 reported malaria within 3 days of parade
7th Wiltshire 50 165 Less infected than other Battalions
4th Kings royal rifle corps 70 10 Only 30% not had malaria
2nd Northumberland Fusiliers 80 209 146 hospitalized en route to France with
malaria. Average daily sick parade = 60
10th Camerons (Lovat’s scouts) 80 – 57/210 suffering relapses on day of inspection
3rd Royal Fusiliers 70 20 32 hospitalized en route to France
10th Black Watch 80 140 17/42 had malaria in morning sick parade
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers 80 110 40 with malaria en route to France
12th Lancashire Fusiliers 80 56 33 arrived with malaria
Total Mean 76.7 2281d –
aAverage Regimental strength = 800 men per regiment.
bCases with diagnosis confirmed by microscopy.
cBlood smear positive on microscopy.
dMean 15.0% parasite positive ( 2281/15,200, with average regimental strength of 800 men).
Table 4 Malaria cases admitted London General Hospital
February 1917 – January 1919 [61]
Location
of origin
Admissions P.vivax P.falciparum Mixed Pv
and Pf
(n) (n) (n) (n)
Salonika 1686 746 82 20
East Africa 1049 496 43 26
India 126 35 2 –
Egypt 86 29 3 –
Palestine 63 11 3 –
Mesopotamia 46 19 – –
West Africa 35 4 2 –
France 48 15 – –
South Africa 25 4 1 –
Italy 25 7 5 –
Singapore 16 4 1 –
North America 11 3 – –
Total 3216 1373 142 46
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was required to tailor to the environment, although this
was only really appreciated towards the end of the War.
Negligence and scepticism with application of preventive
measures were common and contradictory instructions
were given by officers [18,77].
Late in the war, at least in Macedonia and Palestine, a
considerable effort was placed on net design with the pro-
motion of modified bivouac tents for rapid deployment
(Figure 11). A small net for use by individual men was
considered preferable but these were unavailable and
two man tents were used in Macedonia. Reserve net
supplies for damaged nets were not included in logistics
requests and frequently there were operational short-
ages. Mosquito-proof canvas huts could have been
adapted on a larger scale.
In view of these restrictions, and despite concerns over
quinine efficacy, military orders prioritized quinine
prophylaxis with the aim to interrupt transmission and
eliminate the parasite reservoir. It was recognized that
quinine treatment could lessen the severity of an
Table 5 Approaches to malaria control prior to and during World War One
Pre – 1914 1914 - 1918
Prevention European theatre & British
Dominions [77-79]
British [9-11,13,17,25,30,44,66,73,80-83] French [18,30,84]
- Systematic inspection and notification
of cases
- Scientific evidence on control strategy required - Preliminary study of epidemiological
conditions [84]
- Protection against mosquito bites
(portable nets)
- Specially trained medical officers and orderlies
required [44]
- Appropriate housing
- Portable mosquito proof rooms - Availability of malaria diagnostic units with
microscopes [9,44]
- Eliminating parasite reservoir
- Protection of hands and feet (boots) - Sanitary sections in field Divisions to supply
material for anti-mosquito work [82]
- Small anti-larval measures and
measures against adult larva
- Medicinal skin protection (effect transient) - Mosquito brigades (in Palestine) - Quinine treatment and prevention
- Mosquito reduction (fumigation, traps, fish as
larvicides, oiling, drainage, screening breeding
water, filling pools, piping to prevent leakage)
- Frequent inspections of anti-mosquito
work [82]
- Collective mechanical defences
- Detection, isolation and specific treatment of
all infected soldiers [79]
- Entomological studies of anopheles species [17] - Bed nets and mosquito protection [84]
- Prevention by treatment - Recognition problem of mistaken diagnoses
[44]
- Reduction of negligence and scepticism
of preventive measures by authorities [18]
- Personal domestic hygiene - Siting of camps and evacuation of areas [11] - Reduction of contradictory instructions on
quinine use to avoid chaotic use of quinine
- Quinine prophylaxis - Instructions on use of mosquito nets and net
design. 45Bivouac netted tents [17], (Figure 11)
- Urine inspection for quinine detection
(Tarant’s reagent) to control prophylactic
administration of quinine [18]
- Consider public prophylaxis with quinine
(if troops contracting infection outside barracks)
- Mosquito-proof canvas huts [17] - Malaria specialists as advisers [84]
- Australian [24,55]
- Repeated measurements (malaria surveys) - Mosquito swats [17] - Malaria diagnostic units with field
laboratories [55]
- Keeping troops in non-malarial hill areas [79] - Occasional use of pyrethrum sprays
(Lefroy’s fluid) for mosquito control [30]
- Aggressive control of mosquito breeding
along front lines [55]
- Imposition of fines for non-cooperation
Legislation on engineering work
- Quinine prophylaxis recommended by Ross and
Medical Advisory Committee, but unfavourable
response from medical officers [10,80]
- German [85]
- High standards of disease prevention
Prevention in German possessions [86,87] - Drainage operations, although impossible in
mountainous terrain, or where campaign was
highly mobile (eg, Palestine) [25]
- Emphasis on quininization [85]
- Local conditions decided most
important activity
- Indian troops exempted from use of mosquito
nets on grounds they were unpopular, and they
had acquired malarial immunity [66]
- Quininization (simplest and cheapest) - Pamphlets explaining dangers [17]
- Supervised quinine therapy and quinine
prophylaxis trusted to exterminate malaria
even in very badly infected areas,
- Recruitment blood examination for selection
of smear negative candidates (West Indies) [13]
- Environmental mechanical protection - Instruction of medical officers on spleen
examination technique of Indian troops [73]
- Personal anti-mosquito measures
- Reliance on acquired immunity [87]
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though relapses invariably occurred. In the UK, during
1916, the total issue of quinine exceeded 25 tons, or
nearly 66 million 5-gr doses [14], and because of supply
issues the Government requisitioned all quinine stocks.
The average monthly supply in 1917 and 1918 was 5.5tons. The influence of Ross on this strategy was substan-
tial [78,89]. Some doctors, however, thought that in re-
gions of Macedonia, Albania, and the Tauris Mountains
there were different forms of malaria that could not be
treated by quinine [76]. This undermined confidence in
its use although there could be no dilemma in drug
Figure 10 Protective clothing for mosquito protection. A
general view of the special protective clothing in use. A head net is
worn over a shrapnel helmet, and the special pattern shorts are
turned down under the upper turn of the puttees. The gauntlet
gloves are seen on the hands and forearms. (published under the
Open Government Licence, v 2.0), [11].
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Austrian publications unrestricted prophylaxis was pro-
moted and its use was a military order [76].
Because of restrictions on supplies there was increased
interest in Germany in manufacturing a synthetic alter-
native anti-malarial, although the chemical industry was
more committed to developing poison gases [46]. It was
only at the end of the War, when Germany was cut-off
from the world supply of quinine, that Pamaquin devel-
opment was stimulated and achieved by 1925 [71].
Questions of resistance to quinine became topical in
view of the frequency of recurrences which lead to con-
flict in Germany on the distinction between acquired
drug resistance, and drug selection of pre-existing resist-
ant strains [76,90].
Quininization
Quinine prophylaxis was defined by Ross as ‘treatment
of persons who have not yet shown signs of illness but
may possibly become infected’ [78], and by Treadgold as
‘regular administration of quinine with a view to prevent
the development or recrudescence of clinical malaria’
[80]. The first definition suggests it prevents new infec-
tions occurring, whereas the second emphasizes the pre-
vention of recurrent infection due to failed primary
clearance. This difference encapsulates the confusion
and controversy that surrounded quinine treatment and
prophylaxis at the time of the First World War. This
was fuelled by widely varying practices and published
recommendations in dosage and regimens which were
mostly empirical, and subsequently were directed by
military authorities following quinine trials in the UK,
France, Macedonia, and Palestine (Table 6). Often trials
did not assess the percentage not infected before prophy-
laxis commenced. Results on efficacy were variously re-
ported as good or poor by different national authorities.
Quinine was widely used by the German troops but data
was censored on its evaluation, [68,85,91].
Although quinine prophylaxis was often ordered it was
not enforced and officers were neglectful [18]. Ross con-
sidered that therapeutic efficacy in a war setting related
to the level of supervision of intake preferring long-term
daily prescription which was difficult to implement. He
differed from several other European malariologists in
recommending continuous dosage [78]. Quinine parades
with supervised observation interrupted activities and
falls in attendance were difficult to correct if 100,000
Figure 11 Alternative military net designs for mosquito protection. (A) Mosquito net with bell tent design as supplied to French soldiers in
Salonika, Macedonia (source: The Times History of the War), [88]. (B) Bivouac net opened to show interior. The ledges forming beds are dug
down to a depth of 9 inches and the trench for feet is dug down to a depth of 18 inches (published with permission of the Royal army Medical
Corps Journal), [11]. (C) Modified Bivouac net supplied to British soldiers in Macedonia in 1918. The net is intended for two men and is covered
by the two bivouac sheets. The front slides up and down the guy rope (published under the Open Government Licence, v 2.0), [19]. (D) Same
net as in (c) showing alterations to improve protection (published under the Open Government Licence, v 2.0) [11].
Brabin Malaria Journal 2014, 13:497 Page 17 of 22
http://www.malariajournal.com/content/13/1/497troops were involved [1]. A great amount of preparation
was required to make this strategy effective. During the
First World War, P. vivax malaria showed a pattern of
relapse within two months of initial treatment with a
tendency to relapse about 8–10 months later, but it was
unknown whether recurrences were recrudescent blood
stage infection or derived from a latent tissue stage
[101]. Ross later changed his opinion and conceded that
some relapses occurred in spite of the most vigorous
daily supervision, but disagreed with the French whose
approach was to suspend quinine between relapses [89].
Memoranda from the British Ministry of War endea-
voured to provide some clarity [10]. Initially orders were
given from 1st June 1916 for daily doses of 6 gr quinine
to troops in malarial areas following an attack of mal-
aria, but as summer progressed, all troops, whether mal-
arial or not, were given quinine as there was some
evidence it mitigated the severity of an attack. The funda-
mental problem related to the knowledge gap concerning
the exo-erythrocytic hepatic stage of development of P.
vivax. Without this knowledge it was impossible for clini-
cians to distinguish between the need for a drug toprovide a radical cure of P. vivax infection which cleared
hepatic hypnozoites, from suppressive cure, which would
control overt clinical attacks of both P. vivax and P. falcip-
arum malaria [102]. As a result the war-time data on a
large number of clinical trials from centres in the UK aim-
ing to evaluate quinine, and routes of its administration,
were difficult to interpret [63,94]. This dilemma was cap-
tured at a meeting of the Royal Society of Tropical Medi-
cine and Hygiene held in London in late 1917 when,
following the presentation of trial results by Ross compar-
ing treatment regimens, two directly opposing opinions
were expressed [103]. Sir William Osler emphasized that
‘the man who could not treat malaria successfully with
quinine should give up the practice of medicine’, then
adding ‘in divided doses’. In contrast, Warrington-Yorke
commented that ‘no-one is able to state how quinine
should be taken, in which manner, and in what doses’. He
considered the results presented by Ross meaningless as
all treated cases were not diagnosed following microscopic
confirmation of malaria at the time of relapse. In conclu-
sion, without definite evidence on efficacy the data was
‘worse than useless, because it misleads other people and
Table 6 British and German military quinine prophylactic and treatment regimens for malaria 1914–1918
Author or source
[reference]
Area and
subjects
Year Prophylactic dose regimena,b Treatment dose regimen
British
Hehir [79] India 1914 All troops quinine treated not < 4 months –
Wenyon [17] Macedonia 1916 5,10,20,30gr/day tried 30gr/day x 24 days + arsenic + iron
1918
Editorial BMJ [81] No restriction 1916 Large doses needed –
Laveran [92] Macedonia 1917 40gr/day (split dose) x 7.5 months –
Treadgold [80] Macedonia 1917 5-15gr x 2 consecutive days at 1 wk intervals –
Manson [93] No restriction 1917 5gr/day, or 10gr/x2wk, or 15gr x 10th day 5gr x 3 days, or 15gr x1 dose x 1 wk; Iron +
arsenic for 8wks; then 5gr/day x 3 months x
every Spring x 2 years
Stephens [63] Liverpool
evacuated troops
1917 Interrupted courses preferable to continuous.
Various doses and scheduling. Arsenic not
beneficial, strychnine more beneficial
–
Ross [94] UK special
treatment centres
1917 5-60gr/day investigated x 3 wks in various schedules
and administration routes. Concluded 60gr/wk
reduces relapses to 10% per month
Short and long sterilizing treatments.
No difference with administration route
Regulations
UK Govt [95]
UK troops 1917 Y scheme: Every soldier to keep 60gr for self-treatment
if relapses. Report relapse day or night for blood film
and fever check
Y scheme: 15gr/day x 14 days then
60gr/wk x 6 days in optional divided doses
Paisseau [96] Balkans 1917 1-2gr/day x 3 days x 1–2 months Iron + arsenic x
1–2 months
IV adrenaline if rigors 2gr preferred if P.
falciparum
1918
Anderson [97] Macedonia 1917 20-45gr both intensive and interrupted x 1–2 months IV strychnine and adrenaline
1918
Alport [98] Salonika 1917 1-10gr/day continuous; or 35gr/day x 71 days Cerebral malaria: 60-100gr in 12 hours x
3 days IM,IV, rectal
War Govt
Medical Services
Publication [13]
Conflict zones 1914 10gr x 21 days. Arsenic to reduce anaemia with
iron and strychnine (IV if severe). Opium
(Warburg’s tincture). Venepuncture to reduce
toxaemia (≥1 pint), and replace
with normal salinec
Consider blood transfusion twice fortnightly.
Splenectomy in severe anaemia
1918
Germand
Bruns [91] Macedonia 1917 0.3 -0.6 g/day + arsenic. Recommended 1.5 – 2.0
g/day x 2 weekly x 6–8 wks. Repeat annually
for 3 years
–
1918
Kestner [85] Macedonia 1916 0.3 -0.9 g/day –
Romania 1918
Stendel [99] Eastern front 1916 0.3 g alternating days x 6 wks –
Abstracts [100] No restriction 1918 Summaries on quinine studies. Various dosese –
agr refers to grains of quinine. One grain = 64.8 mg quinine; IM: intra-muscular; IV: Intravenous.
bThe modern treatment regimen is 20 mg/kg loading dose, and then 10 mg/kg x 3 daily x 7 days. This total loading dose in grains for a 75 kg man, equates to
23.1 grains. The maintenance dose equates to 11.6 grains x 3 daily.
cNeeds further investigation.
dGerman studies use dose suffix of g (not gr).
eDetails may have been censored.
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value of iron, arsenic and strychnine which were some-
times used as adjunct treatments (Table 6) were not
systematically assessed. A few small clinical trials that
investigated treatment with and without arsenic came
to varied conclusions [63,104]. Revised recommendationscalled the Y scheme outlined in Table 6 were eventually
implemented by the British.
There were concerns related to possible effects of
quinine in reducing immunity to severe malaria, or ad-
vantages if released malarial antigen stimulated immun-
ity [105]. Theories on malaria toxins lead some practice
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which had echoes of enlightenment blood-letting [13]
(Table 6). It is unclear from the government publication
mentioning this how frequently it was practised, or at
what stage during the War. No really satisfactory result
was obtained. No one treatment provided a certain cure
and the most effective treatments, and those with mul-
tiple intra-muscular quinine injections, were almost
more severe than the disease. The use of the maximum
tolerated dose instead of the minimum effective dose
was preferred in favour of reducing the risk of selecting
resistant parasites. Some considered quinine was a useful
prophylactic against Blackwater Fever, and it was also
used for the treatment of pneumonia [106]. Conversely
Treadgold concluded that the severity of malaria in
Macedonia was increased in some cases by prior quini-
nization. He quoted Celli who claimed quinine prophy-
laxis produced some effect, but compared to results of
mosquito protection, the results were negligible [80].
Lest we forget
The First World War was a vast uncontrolled experi-
ment in politics, military innovation and medical prac-
tice. Malaria parasites were unaligned and unexpected
adversaries which battered both the victors and the van-
quished. Their control would require breaching political
barriers as well as improved scientific knowledge and
understanding. Medical progress would require much
greater insight into experimental method and the com-
plex nature of the adversary, the individual, and the en-
vironmental circumstances of war [107]. At the
beginning of the War the extent of the malaria problem
was effectively unknown to military planners and as a
consequence there were insignificant efforts at contain-
ment. Malaria rapidly spread to civilian populations asFigure 12 Post-war postcard illustrating combination management owell as to the military, creating a complex emergency. In
temperate zones, where P. vivax was the dominant para-
site, ideal conditions were developing for parasite and
mosquito, possibly enhanced by the climatic conditions
of the strong 1914–1915 and 1918–1919 El Nino events.
The trans-migration of troops and parasites across Europe
favoured the spread of new parasite strains, which flour-
ished in non-immune host populations of soldiers. Text-
book ideal conditions were created for multiple epidemics,
which would involve vast numbers of soldiers, from
South–East England to the shores of Arabia, from the
Arctic to the Mediterranean. Moreover, the statistical esti-
mates of the numbers of malaria cases derived in this
analysis are likely to be sizable underestimates, not least
because malaria surveillance data went un-reported from
several war fronts, as did civilian related malarial deaths.
Censorship of German data limited information available
for axis forces on case numbers, mortality, as well as on
their military and medical response.
The military and medical response of allied forces was
at first limited, perhaps because of perceived greater de-
mands for directed military action the response gathered
pace in 1916 when it was understood that whole armies
could be immobilized by the malaria parasite, defeating
military objectives. Medical facilities were required on a
very large scale to treat acutely affected and chronically
disabled soldiers with recurrent symptoms. In the search
for scientific evidence this became an experimental field
of medicine with research on drug trials, haematology
and immunology, including attempts to culture the mal-
aria parasite [108-110]. The priority for an effective
treatment was paramount but, in the absence of know-
ledge of the exo-erythrocytic developmental stage of P.
vivax, these attempts would lack resolution. Not until
the late 1920s was it apparent that P. vivax recurrencesf a malaria patient.
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[101]. Prior to then the treatment response to the two
parasitic species was frequently viewed as synonomous.
The endeavour to defeat this enemy became controversial
despite the efforts of Ross to co-ordinate treatment trials
and it was not resolved until years after the War. It is a
good example of the failure of the clinical trial approach
to resolve treatment practices when the scientific mecha-
nisms underlying the disease are unknown. The need for
patient care of soldiers was paramount and in response,
both in Liverpool and Sierra Leone, the Liverpool School
of Tropical Medicine closed its research laboratories and
converted them to hospital facilities that could accommo-
date clinical trials [62]. Grassi in Italy came out of retire-
ment in 1917 to aid the Italian effort to cope with the
malaria crisis by running a dispensary and research station
[6]. The influence of Ross on prevention guided sanitation
efforts and implementation of rapid malaria surveys,
which included entomological investigations, which acted
as a platform for control activities and aided the allied
military effort. The lower reported number of allied com-
pared to Turkish malaria deaths in Macedonia probably
reflects better allied malaria control strategy. These efforts
served to educate soldiers and officers on the malaria
problem, which was no longer hidden.
Underlying national and international conflicts influ-
enced progress. These varied from opinions on treat-
ment such as ‘there are almost as many treatments of
malaria as there are people who have written on the sub-
ject’ [103], to disagreements on ideas for bed net design
[17], or more fundamentally, to differences in racial the-
ories of immunity to malaria [76]. The culture of com-
mand was an umbrella over-riding alternative choices,
and recommendations were difficult to reach by Com-
mittees whose agendas were broad, and at times imperi-
alistic [64,111]. Much credit rests on individual medical
officers whose clinical acumen and decision-making was
paramount in patient care in rapidly changing local cir-
cumstances. Patients could be bewildered by the variety
of treatment options as illustrated in this post-war car-
toon postcard from sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 12). Al-
lied activities become better integrated later in the War
as demonstrated by the rapid control of the English out-
break. The nationalization of malaria control commenced
rapidly after the War in those European countries most af-
fected, Greece [5], Italy [6], and Palestine [112], but with
little progress in Africa. The disease remains a threat in
war zones today [113], and on the Centenary of the First
World War, soldiers continue to experience high infection
rates in malarious areas in Africa [114-116].
James in his Presidential address to the Royal Society
of Tropical Medicine in London concluded that ‘every-
one who had actually taken part in efforts to deal with
malaria in different parts of the world during the Warcame home with the uncomfortable feeling that we knew
much less about the disease than we thought we did,
and that it might be quite a good plan to sink our pride
and to begin again, in all humility, and with greater re-
spect and reverence, to try to fathom out some of its
mysteries’ [117]. A view that is as relevant today.
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